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Non-technical summary 
Private equity (PE) firms have long time emphasized their role as investors who create value in 
their portfolio companies. In this paper we analyze a key strategy of PE investors, the so-called 
buy-and-build strategy (B&B), and evaluate the value creation ability of the investors through 
B&B. B&B is a transaction in which PE investors acquire a firm serving as a “platform” for 
further acquisitions. The follow-on acquisitions (“add-ons”) are usually facilitated by the PE 
investors as well. 
Our results show that PE investors cherry-pick more profitable firms for B&B transactions. 
While profitability is important for common PE targets as well, platforms in a B&B additionally 
need to realize a sufficient turnover growth in order to be selected for the transaction by the 
investors. In contrast, add-ons are rather slowly growing firms. Thus, we find evidence that 
within a B&B, PE investors facilitate the acquisition of slowly growing add-ons through fast 
growing platforms, which can utilize the assets of the add-ons more successfully. Furthermore, it 
seems that PE investors prefer firms with a higher capacity utilization measured as the turnover 
per firm's assets. Moreover, we find that platforms experience an increase and add-ons 
experience a decrease in capacity utilization after the B&B. This result suggests that PE investors 
use B&B to allocate resources and capacity more efficiently by shifting resources from firms 
with excess capacity (low utilization) to firms whose capacity is near exhaustion (high 
utilization). However, B&B have a positive impact on firms' profitability, and thus, B&B 
possibly improve firms' value, only for platforms and add-ons with an increasing industry-
adjusted utilization measured as turnover per total assets. For firms with decreasing turnover per 
total assets B&B lead to performance decrease. 
  
Das wichtigste in Kürze 
Private Equity (PE)-Gesellschaften betonen seit längerer Zeit ihren Beitrag zur Wertsteigerung  
in Portfoliogesellschaften. Dieses Diskussionspapier befasst sich mit einer zentralen Strategie der 
PE-Investoren, der so genannten Buy-and-Build-Strategie (B&B), und analysiert die Fähigkeit 
der Investoren durch B&B den Wert ihrer Portfoliounternehmen zu steigern. B&B sind 
Transaktionen, in welchen der PE-Investor zunächst ein Unternehmen übernimmt, das als 
Plattform für weitere Akquisitionen dient. Es folgen weitere Unternehmenskäufe, die so 
genannten „add-ons“, die in der Regel ebenfalls durch den Investor initiiert werden.  
Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass PE-Investoren profitablere Unternehmen für die B&B 
wählen. Während Profitabilität auch für die üblichen PE-Zielgesellschaften wichtig ist, 
realisieren für B&B ausgesuchte Plattformunternehmen zusätzlich Umsatzwachstum. Im 
Gegensatz dazu sind Add-on-Unternehmen eher langsamer wachsende Unternehmen. Es zeigt 
sich, dass im Rahmen der B&B PE-Investoren die Übernahme von langsamer wachsenden Add-
ons durch stärker wachsenden Plattformunternehmen, die  die Vermögenswerte der Add-ons 
effektiver umsetzen können, unterstützen. Ferner, scheint es, dass die Investoren Unternehmen 
mit einer höheren Kapazitätsauslastung, gemessen am Umsatz pro Unternehmensvermögenswert, 
bevorzugen. Darüber hinaus liefert die Studie Evidenz darüber, dass die Kapazitätsauslastung der 
Plattformunternehmen nach der B&B steigt während die der Add-ons sinkt. Dieses Ergebnis ist 
ein Hinweis darauf, dass PE-Investoren die B&B für die effizientere Allokation von Ressourcen 
und Kapazitäten nutzen, indem sie Ressourcen von Unternehmen mit Überschusskapazitäten 
(niedrige Kapazitätsauslastung) zu Unternehmen mit fast ausgeschöpften Kapazitäten (hohe 
Kapazitätsauslastung) verschieben. Im Hinblick auf die Profitabilität und somit auf eine 
Verbesserung des Unternehmenswerts zeigt sich ein positiver Einfluss der B&B auf Plattform- 
und Add-Unternehmen mit steigender Auslastung gemessen am Umsatz pro Vermögenswert 
nach Branchenberichtigung. Für Unternehmen mit sinkendem Umsatz pro Vermögenswert führt 
die B&B zu einer Verschlechterung der Performance. 
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Abstract
This article documents a new value creation function of private equity investors who carry
out buy-and-build strategies. Buy-and-build strategies constitute an initial acquisition
of a rm, serving as a \platform", by a private equity investor and follow-on private
equity-backed acquisitions (\add-ons"). The investor merges the platform and add-ons
into a single entity. Additionally to the selection of well performing rms by the investors
prior to the transaction, we identify value-enhancing potentials which private equity in-
vestors explore through buy-and-builds. The investors bring together platforms with lower
capacity utilization and lower returns, and add-ons with higher utilization and higher re-
turns in order to allocate resources and capacity more eciently and to improve rms'
performance. However, the buy-and-build strategies only have a positive impact on the
protability of rms with increasing industry adjusted utilization. Consequently the more
ecient deployment of assets for the generation of sales drives the improved performance
after buy-and-builds.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a key strategy of PE investors, the so-called buy-and-build strat-
egy (B&B), which can be considered as a subsequent step of a strategic alliance. B&B
are transactions in which a PE investor acquires a rm serving as a \platform" for fur-
ther acquisitions. The follow-on acquisitions (\add-ons") are usually facilitated by the
PE investor as well. While PE industry participants perceive the B&B as a key strat-
egy for value creation (Buy and Build Monitor 2010), this kind of transactions is largely
unexplored scientically. Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) document the importance of
B&B and show that acquisitions carried out during the holding period of the PE target
contribute to enterprize value uplift. However, the sources of value increase remain un-
explored. The main research question in this study is what the sources of value creation
through B&B executed by PE investors are.
The main contribution of this paper is that it shows how PE investors combine resources to
form new entities and to increase their usage eciency in order to create value in the new
entity. This paper takes an innovative approach in looking at capital utilization which may
translate in value creation and furthermore, it takes two perspectives of value creation by
looking at earnings-based measures and rm growth. Although PE and M&A individually
have received much attention in the corporate nance literature, PE-backed M&A have
been almost completely neglected. We aim to close this gap by analyzing the sources of
value creation through B&B. For this reason, we rst evaluate a possible selection eect
resulting from the ability of investors to cherry-pick the most promising rms. Second,
we determine the consequences of B&B for the participating rms and derive the basis
for value added. Moreover, we address important questions about the role of nancial
sponsors in allocating resources eciently among the rms involved in B&B.
We identify a sample of 844 companies merged within a B&B transaction between 2000
and 2008 in 15 European countries and show that companies involved in B&B are larger,
less indebted and more protable in the year prior to the transaction than companies
not involved in B&B. This is a conrmation of the selection ability of PE investors who
are able to identify the companies with the highest performance potential (Cressy et al.,
2007).
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A multivariate analysis of the impact of rm characteristics on the probability of being
acquired in a B&B provides a conrmation of the selection eect in B&B. PE investors
choose more protable rms for B&B transactions. While protability is important for
common PE targets as well, platforms in B&B additionally need to realize a sucient
turnover growth in order to be selected for the transaction by the investors. In contrast,
add-ons are rather slowly growing rms. Thus, we nd evidence that within B&B, PE
investors facilitate the acquisition of slowly growing add-ons through fast growing plat-
forms, which can utilize the assets of the add-ons more successfully. Furthermore, it seems
that PE investors prefer rms with a higher capacity utilization measured as the turnover
per rm's assets.
The post-transaction analysis and panel regressions show that platforms experience an in-
crease and add-ons experience a decrease in capacity utilization after the B&B. This result
suggests that PE investors use B&B to allocate resources and capacity more eciently by
shifting resources from rms with excess capacity (low utilization) to rms whose capacity
is near exhaustion (high utilization). However, B&B have a positive impact on rms'
protability, and thus, B&B possibly improve rms' value, only for platforms and add-ons
with an increasing industry-adjusted utilization measured as turnover per total assets. For
rms with decreasing turnover per total assets B&B leads to performance decrease.
Specically for target rms of PE transactions, Davis et al. (2009) nd that they ex-
perience an intensication of resource reallocation and yield a substantial productivity
growth. Facilitating B&B strategies, and thus intervening in strategic decisions of the
entrepreneurs, the PE investors should be able to add value to their portfolio companies.
The idea of value creation through B&B relates to the involvement of VC funds in facil-
itating strategic alliances, which is documented by Lindsey (2008). These alliances are
shown to create real value for the portfolio rms as measured by exiting through IPOs
or acquisitions. Other related studies conrm the benets of strategic relationships in
combination with block ownership (Allen and Phillips, 2000) or corporate venture capital
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we describe the
B&B strategy. Section 3 presents a literature background and the hypothesis development.
The data and descriptive analysis are presented in Section 4. The research design for the
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evaluation of the selection eect and the value creation eect is developed in Section 5.
Section 5 also presents the results for both the selection and value creation eects. The
nal section concludes.
2 Description of the buy-and-build strategy
A B&B strategy comprises an initial purchase of a company by a PE investor who then uses
it as a platform for subsequent acquisitions of companies or divisions strategically aligned
with the platform company (Fabozzi, 2002). The additional acquisitions are referred to
as add-on acquisitions. The investor combines the dierent companies into a single entity.
During the holding period of several years, the PE rm tries to increase the value of the
newly created group before selling it to an industrial company (trade sale), to another
nancial investor (secondary purchase), or via an IPO. An important feature of B&B,
which is also generally common for PE transactions, is that the platform as well as the
add-on acquisitions are frequently nanced with high debt (leveraged buyout transactions,
LBOs). Thus, B&B are also known as leveraged build-ups.
The PE rm chooses a platform company from which it can pursue its acquisition strategy.
The platform company usually exhibits an exceptional characteristic such as a reputation
for high quality (Smit, 2001). According to the Buy & Build Monitor 2010, add-on
companies are typically smaller than the platforms and have specic tangible or intangible
assets (e.g., new technology, additional markets) which oer value-adding potential to the
new group of companies. In most cases, the B&B is structured as a horizontal acquisition
strategy in which the platform company and the add-ons operate in the same industry.
B&B tend to occur in fragmented industries with no clear market leader (see, Smit, 2001).
By investing in fragmented industries, PE rms are able to avoid antitrust concerns, and,
additionally, maintain a plethora of potential targets at their disposal. In such cases, the
B&B serve as a vehicle to consolidate fragmented industries of considerable size, similar
to roll-up transactions (Brown et al., 2005).
The rst group of value-adding potential is related to the PE investors, who usually
undertake organizational, operational and nancial changes in the target companies. These
changes could be a response to factors such as the constraints of high leverage, changes in
3
the managers' incentives and in the way managers are compensated, monitored and advised
(e.g., Kaplan 1989a, Baker and Wruck, 1989). A high level of debt allows a company to pay
less in taxes by deducting interest payments and it gives managers less freedom to pursue
self-enriching projects (e.g., Jensen 1989). Furthermore, the target company benets from
the know-how of the PE investor, who, in addition to oering advice well-founded by his
industry experience and his network of industry contacts, takes care of issues related to
nancing, acquisitions, and exiting (e.g., Kaplan, 1989). The second group of sources for
value adding, might be associated with the classical advantages and synergy eects from
mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The market position of the involved companies can
be improved signicantly; rms could benet from knowledge and technology transfers,
companies may gain access to new markets for their products, may add new products to
their portfolio or new technologies to their production processes. According to Ross et al.
(2002), beyond the strategic advantages and the new market power stemming from the
increased company size, the sources of synergy from M&A include cost reductions (e.g,
economies of scale or scope) and tax gains (e.g, use of tax losses from net operating losses
or use of free debt capacity).
3 Related literature and hypothesis development
B&B originate a joint acquisition relationship, in which a nancial buyer can provide
access to capital, nancial engineering and deal-making techniques. In return, the platform
company, as a strategic buyer, can provide management expertise and an increased return
on investment through synergies and other business arrangements involving the target.
Such joint acquisitions may allow the acquiring parties to complement each other and
capitalize on acquisition opportunities that neither party would be willing to pursue on its
own (Rousseau, 2010). Therefore, as M&A supported by PE investors, B&B open value-
adding potential for the participating companies, resulting from both the PE transaction
(e.g., Kaplan, 1989, Guo et al., 2010) and the rms' strategic mergers (e.g., Devos et al.,
2008).
Hence, we look at possible synergies generated by B&B transactions by examining capital
utilization of platform and add-ons prior and after the transaction and document dier-
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ences. Then we analyze the impact on corporate performance and determine the impact
factors on earnings-based performance measures and rm growth.
3.1 Corporate performance
Many valuation approaches use corporate performance as a basis for determining the
rm's value (e.g., Fernandez 2002). Thus, an improvement of the performance after B&B
could be used as an indicator for the value creation potential of this strategy. Corporate
performance can be reected using dierent measures like earnings or cash ow measures
as well as rm growth.
Earlier studies provide empirical evidence on the positive impact of management and
leveraged buyouts on operating performance due to improved incentives rather than layos
or managerial exploitation of shareholders through inside information (e.g., Kaplan, 1989,
Smith, 1990 and Opler, 1992). More recently, Guo et al. (2007), nd only modest increases
in operating and cash ow margins that are much smaller than those found in the '80s and
'90s data. However, Kaplan and Stroemberg (2009) argue that the empirical evidence on
the signicant operating improvements for LBOs should be interpreted with some caution,
due to a potential selection bias.
In line with the so-called Jensen hypothesis (Jensen, 1986, 1989), Cressy et al. (2007)
nd that PE-backed rms perform better than non-PE-backed rms regarding the rst
three post-buyout years. However, the selection of ex-ante more protable target rms
plays a key role in raising performance after the transaction. Furthermore, Cressy et al.
(2007) analyze the role of specialized PE rms on operating performance and nd that
industry specialization of investors adds additional premium to the higher performance
of the PE-backed rms. As to corporate performance after M&A, several studies use ex
post accounting performance or plant-level productivity to examine potential operating
improvements in the combined rms. The results are ambiguous. Ravenscraft and Scherer
(1987) nd little or no evidence whereas Healy et al. (1992) and Heron and Lie (2002) nd
that mergers induce an improvement in operating performance which results from increases
in asset productivity of the merged rms relative to their industries (Healy et al., 1992).
In addition to the possibility of gaining post-transaction synergies, the displacement of
inecient managers implies a positive development of operating protability relative to
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the pre-takeover situation (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). On the other hand, if mergers
take place because managers pursue growth rather than prots, or because of managerial
hubris and herd behavior, they can lead to decreasing eciency and decreasing protability
(e.g., Gugler et al., 2003). In their review article, Martynova and Renneboog (2008) state
that mainly authors using earnings-based performance measures tend to nd a negative
post-M&A development of protability while authors looking at cash ow measures nd
more positive results.
As to the pre-transaction performance of rms involved in PE and B&B transactions, the
investors might expect sucient cash ow generation potential in the rms in order to
service the additional debt from the transaction nancing. Therefore, there should be a
positive relationship between a rm's protability and the probability of being involved in
a transaction. While underperforming rms are more likely to be subject of a takeover bid
in M&A (Barnes, 2000), high protability, which indicates good management and high
internal cash generation potential, is a likely characteristic of an acquirer (Harford, 2005)
which in the B&B case would correspond to a platform.
Hypothesis 1a: PE rms select better performing targets for B&B.
Hypothesis 1b: There are signicant dierences between the performances of platforms
and add-ons prior to the transaction.
Hypothesis 1c: B&B lead to performance improvements in the involved rms.
According to the growth-resource mismatch hypothesis of Barnes (2000), high growth and
low liquidity make an attractive investment target for an acquirer who has the nancial
capacity to release growth potential; low growth and high liquidity make an attractive tar-
get for an acquirer looking to gain access to more nancing possibilities. In both scenarios
the participating rms can take advantage of the resources or the growth opportunities
of the partner rm. Lehn et al. (1990) argue that growth is positively related to a rm's
need for capital. Slowly growing rms may have low capital needs and hence have more
capital available for acquisitions whereas rms in fast-growth industries or fast-growing
rms are likely to be better able to collect the nancing needed to buy industry peers.
In fast-growing industries rms may benet as much as possible from the growth in their
own industry by expanding through M&A (Andrade and Staord, 2004). Since PE in-
vestors initiate and execute B&B, they may try to select platforms and add-ons in such
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industries. At the same time, rms in mature or declining industries may want to shift
their resources into growing industries and undertake diversifying M&A to guarantee their
long-run survival (e.g., Powell and Yawson, 2005).
Baeyens and Manigart (2006) nd that PE investors select rms with substantial growth
options and suggest that PE investors try to identify the most promising, growth oriented
rms and use the historical growth path as a signal for future growth. Combining the
evidence for PE and M&A transactions, we dene the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a: Firm's growth prior to the transaction inuences the probability of being
a platform in a B&B positively and the probability of being an add-on negatively.
Hypothesis 2b: B&B improve the growth opportunities of involved rms.
3.2 Capacity utilization
While the relationship between capacity utilization and PE activity has not received any
academic attention until now, there are many studies on the impact of capacity utilization
on merger activities and its development after M&A. Synergy gains arising from operating
improvements and increase of the productive eciency are often reasons justifying M&A
activity.
Healy et al. (1992) show that the increase in industry-adjusted operating returns af-
ter mergers is attributable to an increase in capacity utilization, measured as the asset
turnover (ratio of sales to total assets) rather than an increase in operating margins. De-
vos et al. (2008) provide evidence that the generated gains from mergers result from an
improved resource allocation rather than from reduced tax payments or increased market
power of the combined rms.
According to Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), when rms purchase assets of higher pro-
ductivity, the assets of the target decline and the assets of the acquirer increase in produc-
tivity. However, the authors nd that the gain in assets' productivity is higher the lower
the selling rm's productivity and the higher the buyer rm's productivity. These results
are consistent with more skilled acquirers being able to transfer skills and to improve the
assets they buy.
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Regarding the capacity utilization as a potential driving force for mergers, Jensen (1993)
and Andrade and Staord (2004) propose that most merger activity in the '70s and '80s
was motivated by the need to eliminate excess capacity. In that time period, excess
capacity drove industry consolidation and restructuring through M&A. As PE investors
usually implement superior governance structures in their portfolio rms, excess capacity
can also be reduced after PE through consolidation or closure of marginal facilities, and
after B&B through removal of duplicate functions and rationalization of operations in
the merged rms. Mergers may also play an \expansionary" role (Andrade and Staord,
2004). In such cases the transactions induce an enlargement of the rm's assets. Andrade
and Staord (2004) nd that during the 1990s, merger activity was more closely related
to industry expansion. The authors argue that the incentives to expand are stronger in
times when existing capacity is close to exhaustion.
In line with the ndings of Maksimovic and Phillips (2001), we expect that B&B trans-
actions facilitate the redeployment of assets. However, in contrast to Maksimovic and
Phillips (2001), we expect to nd evidence for the resource reallocation function of the PE
investors after the B&B which should be visible on a deviating development of capacity
utilization for platforms and add-ons.
Hypothesis 3a: There are signicant dierences between the capacity utilization of
platforms and add-ons prior to the transaction.
Hypothesis 3b: After a B&B, capacity utilizations of platforms and add-ons change in
dierent directions.
3.3 Further factors
Analyzing the possible selection eect in B&B and PE investments we control for some
additional factors.
Debt ratio
The ratio of debt to equity or debt to assets can be used as an indicator of debt capacity.
Firms with an unused debt capacity, measured by a low debt ratio, may be able to create
value by using additional debt to acquire other rms (Trahan and Shawky, 1992). As
such, a low debt ratio can increase the likelihood of initiating a takeover, since transaction
nancing will be easier. As to the targets in a transaction, on the one hand, following
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the growth-resource mismatch hypothesis of Palepu (1986), rms with growth potential
constrained by nancing possibilities will make an attractive target. On the other hand,
low leverage signals unused debt capacity, which makes the rm attractive to a potential
buyer. In line with this argumentation, Barnes (2000) nds that a low debt to assets ratio
of potential target rms is a principal factor for motivating a bid.
From the viewpoint of a PE investor, targets with relatively low debt levels should be
attractive. PE transactions are usually nanced with a high fraction of debt, which the
investors pass on to the acquired company. Therefore, rms which possess a high remaining
debt capacity, will be of particular interest for PE investors (e.g., Ambrose and Winters,
1992).
Since the platform and add-on acquisitions in a B&B, like the common PE transactions,
are usually nanced with a high level of debt and a sucient free debt capacity is cru-
cial, we expect the impact of debt on the B&B activity to be negative. Ambrose and
Winters (1992) show this eect for PE investors. The attractiveness of targets with high
debt capacity is found in Trahan and Shawky (1992), Palepu (1986) and Barnes (2000).
Furthermore, we expect the leverage of rms involved in B&B to increase after the trans-
action (Trahan and Shawky, 1992 for M&A). Especially the debt level of the platforms is
likely to experience a stronger rise since both the debt nancing of the platform and the
nancing of the add-ons could be passed on to the platform company .
Firm size
The M&A literature provides also clear evidence on the positive impact of rm size on the
probability of being an acquirer in M&A transactions. This corresponds to the probability
of being a platform in B&B transactions which relates to more resources in terms of
nancial strength, personnel etc. (see Trahan and Shawsky, 1992). From the point of
view of a PE investor, a critical minimum size of the target company is required in order
to compensate the relative high transaction x costs for small investments through the
expected returns. The impact of size on the probability of being a target in M&A is
controversially presented in the literature. The likelihood of acquisition decreases with
the increasing size of the takeover target due to size-related transaction costs (Palepu,
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1986). Smaller targets are also less likely to raise concerns by competition authorities
(Barnes, 2000).
A positive relation between rm size and being a target may be explained by the fact
that acquisitions increase managers' power by increasing the resources under their control
(Jensen, 1986). This argument is undermined by the growth-maximization theory of
Mueller (1972), managers tend to undertake larger investments and to grow at a faster
rate than for stockholder welfare reasons. If an acquirer seeks to achieve economies of scale
or market power through the acquisition, acquiring a larger rm may help to achieve these
goals sooner and at a possibly lower cost than a series of small acquisitions. Evidence
for the positive relation between rm size and the probability of engaging in M&A is
documented by Trahan (1993), Maksimovic and Philips (2001) and Harford (2005) . From
the point of view of a PE investor, a critical minimum size of the target company is required
in order to compensate the relative high transaction x costs for small investments through
the expected returns.
As we expect the PE investment criteria to dominate over the M&A arguments, rm size
should be positively related to the probability of being a PE target, as well as being a
platform or an add-on in a B&B transaction.
Industry concentration
According to PE and B&B practitioners industry consolidation is one of the most im-
portant incentives for B&B. Large and highly fragmented industries oer ideal conditions
for B&B. Such industries should oer the potential for investors to realize synergies and
eciencies from consolidation (Anapolsky, 1998).1
In such industries the investors consolidate several companies into a single company which
has the potential to become a regional or national leader. In line with Andrade and
Staord (2004), Huyghebaert and Luypaert (2010), and Pasiouras et al. (2010) for the
M&A activity, we expect to nd a negative eect of industry concentration on B&B
activity.
Persistence in the transaction activity
The literature on the existence of merger waves (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 2003), on clus-
1See also Kaplan and Stromberg (2004) for general considerations regarding VC and PE investments,
and see Lindsey (2008) and Homann (2008) for strategic alliances and mergers among portfolio companies.
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tering of M&A activity within industries and time (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996,
Harford, 2005, Powell and Yawson, 2005) as well as on industry specialization of PE in-
vestors (Cressy et al., 2007 and Gompers et al., 2008) suggests that there could be an
industry clustering in the transaction activity as well as persistence in the sectoral invest-
ment patterns in B&B activity.
4 Data and descriptive analysis
4.1 Data sources and sample description
To construct a sample of B&B transactions we use the Zephyr data base. Zephyr is
a database provided by Bureau van Dijk which contains information on over 600,000
transactions - M&A, PE and VC transactions, and IPOs - dating back to 1997. However,
the coverage of transactions is more satisfying beginning with 2000.2 In the rst step, we
select all transactions classied as \institutional buyout" completed between January 1,
2000 and December 31, 2008 in the \old" EU-15 countries. To this sample we add all M&A
transactions undertaken either by an acquirer whose business description includes \private
equity" or by a nancial sponsor with transaction nancing \private equity" or \leveraged
buyout". For the purposes of this study, we concentrate on deals after which the acquirer
owns 50 or more percent of the target company.3 This leaves us with a total sample of
3,743 PE transactions over the period 2000 to 2008 for the EU-15. These transactions
comprise the potential platform rms.
In the second step, following the denition of B&B, we identify the relevant sample of PE-
backed M&A transactions. For this reason, we collect all deals undertaken by companies
which have been initially taken over by PE funds. Furthermore, we extract a subgroup of
transactions with a nal stake of more than 50 percent and deal nancing titled \private
2In recent years researchers working in the eld of private equity have become aware of the existence
of this database (e.g., Goossens et al., 2008, Prijcker et al., 2009, Schertler and Tykvova, 2011).
3There is a large number of studies on ownership concentration, corporate governance and rm per-
formance (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, Holderness, 2003). Majority owners have a general interest in
prot maximization and enough control over the assets of the rm and the decisions of the management
to have their interests respected (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
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equity" or \leveraged buyout" and whose acquirer is an industrial company owned by a
PE rm. This group of deals constitutes the sample of add-ons.
In the third step, we collect nancial information for the rms involved in a transaction
and for the group of control companies from Amadeus, another Bureau van Dijk data
base. Amadeus includes accounting data for rms located in Europe.
Table 1 provides information on the distribution of B&B transactions over time (Panel
A) and their geographic composition (Panel B) for the period 2000 to 2008 in the EU-15
countries. The rst panel presents the number of companies involved in B&B transactions
with respect to their function as a platform or add-on. The initial sample consists of 297
platform companies, which have acquired 547 add-on companies during the considered
time period. The development of B&B activity is consistent with the development of the
overall PE market. The number of B&B transactions dropped in 2001 due to the dot-com
bubble burst, and increased dramatically afterwards.4 Looking at the country composition
of the sample in Panel B, the United Kingdom constitutes the largest market, accounting
for nearly one third of all transactions. In general, larger economies with a higher number
of companies serving as targets for acquisitions tend to have more transactions. This
is consistent with the results from the Silvereet Capital's Buy & Build Monitor, which
emphasize the regional distribution of the transactions.
4.2 Control sample
To analyze the B&B, we compare the platform and add-on rms not only with PE targets
but also with similar rms which were not involved in a B&B during the considered
time period. The construction of a valid control group is a crucial feature due to the
non-random selection of rms by PE investors. Specic selection criteria which drive
the investment decision prior to the transactions may inuence the development of the
nancial ratios after the transaction. To avoid the possible selection bias we apply a
propensity score matching and identify \similar" control rms to each rm involved in a
B&B as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). For this reason, we rst split the
whole sample into subsamples for each country, industry and year. By matching buyouts
to controls in the same country and industry, year by year, we mitigate the concerns that
4For a description of the PE market development, see Kaplan, 2009.
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a non-random country/industry/time distribution of the buyouts could aect the results.5
We apply three-to-one nearest-neighbor matching with replacement approach hence for
each platform and add-on rm we identify three control rms with similar size and age in
the year prior to the B&B. Our nal sample includes 844 buyouts and 2,526 control rms.
6
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Since B&B are structured as PE-backed mergers and acquisitions, rms involved in B&B
transactions could have many similarities with the usual PE targets. At the same time,
due to the expected strategic advantages from the merger of platform and add-ons, there
might be signicant dierences in the selection processes and investment criteria between
the usual PE transaction and the B&B strategies. Therefore, we simultaneously analyze
the sample of rms involved in a classical PE transaction and the platforms and add-ons
in B&B.
ROA is the performance measure calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets. UTIL is a measure for the capac-
ity utilization. Similar to Andrade and Staord (2004), we proxy the capacity utilization
rates by the ratio of turnover to total book assets. GROWTH is rm's turnover growth
per annum. DEBT is the variable indicating the level of total debt to total assets. Fur-
thermore, we control for the rm's size (SIZE), measured as the logarithm of total assets,
and for the market concentration using the Herndahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI). To take
into account that PE funds are often specialized and invest in the industry in which they
have already built up know-how, we also employ the logarithm of the lagged number of
transactions in the respective industry and country (DEALS). In order to incorporate the
unobserved heterogeneity of countries and industries, we include country and industry
dummies in the regressions (
 !
Dc;
 !
Di).
Summary statistics and univariate analyses, which we provide in Table 2, are shown for
transaction types (PE or B&B) and rm's function in a B&B (platform or add-on). We
compare nancial ratios of rms involved in a B&B with those of rms not involved in a
5There is evidence that private equity funds are usually specialized investors who prefer investments in
certain industries and countries over investments in others (e.g., Cressy et al., 2007).
6We use the same matching procedure as in Tykvova and Borell, 2012.
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B&B and with the control group (Panel A). Furthermore, we show the summary statistics
of rms involved in a PE transaction versus rms involved in a B&B as a platform or
an add-on (Panel B). As stated by Barnes (2000), nancial ratios are well suited for rm
comparisons as they allow to control for the eect of size on the nancial variables. Further-
more, ratios enable the comparison between the target rm and its industry. Therefore,
we focus on the analysis of nancial ratios of target and control rms as well as on industry
ratios measured as industry median ratios. As a ratio denominator for size adjustments
we use rms' total assets.
To facilitate a comparison of the samples, B&B rms are excluded from the samples of PE
targets. While the information for rms included in the B&B and PE samples is evaluated
for the year preceding the transaction, we use median values for the considered time
period for rms without transactions. We test for the equality of means (t-test allowing
for unequal variances) and the equality of distributions (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test)
between the samples of rms. The variables are dened in the Appendix.
Panel A in Table 2 shows that rms involved in a B&B transaction are signicantly larger
and have lower debt ratios and higher returns on assets at both the mean and median
values in the year before the transaction compared to rms which were not involved in
a B&B transaction. These results are in line with the ability of PE investors, who are
specialized investors and have a vast knowledge of the competitive environment of target
companies and of the companies' strengths and weaknesses, to select potentially superior
performers (Cressy et al., 2007). This conrms the possible selection bias and importance
of creation of an appropriate control sample. As the control rms are matched by size with
the B&B rms there are no signicant dierences in this variable. Also the indebtedness
of the rms involved in B&B and the indebtedness of the control rms do not diverge.
In contrast the capacity utilization and protability of the rms in the B&B sample is
signicantly higher than the respective ratios in the control sample.
Compared to `classical" PE targets B&B rms dier in size, utilization and returns (see
Panel B). While the platforms are signicantly larger than the PE targets, the add-ons
have the smallest size among the three groups of rms. Furthermore, the platforms show
lower mean debt ratios than the PE sample, which could be explained by the free debt
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capacity required in the platforms in order to be able to absorb the additional debt from
the nancing of the add-on acquisitions.
Interestingly, the platforms realize the lowest and the add-ons the highest turnover per
assets among the three groups of rms, which could be an indicator for the resource
reallocation as an incentive for B&B. These results accord with the ndings of Andrade
and Staord (2004) who show that acquirers in M&A transactions have signicantly lower
capacity utilization than their target companies and that the purchasing rms may seek
to consolidate facilities through M&A activities. Thus, it seems that PE investors try
to realize eciency gains by reducing the excess capacity in the platform companies and
by eciently allocating resources and capacity across platforms and add-ons. Through
the shift of resources between platforms and add-ons, eciency gains could be achieved.
Similar to capacity utilization, clear dierences are found for protability. While the add-
ons realize the highest return on assets, the platforms realize the lowest protability among
the three groups of rms. The signicant dierences found between the protability and
productivity of platforms and add-ons provide conrmation of Hypotheses 1b and 2a and
open value-adding potentials through more eective resource allocation between the rms.
The signicant dierence between the performance of platforms and PE targets suggests
that the acquisition of a platform rm within a B&B is driven by long-term strategic
goals rather than by short-term exit or return maximization eorts. These results are
in contrast to the ndings of Andrade and Staord (2004), and Maksimovic and Phillips
(2001) who nd that the acquirers in M&A are rms that are better performers, at least
in relative terms, and also have the ability to carry out the acquisition and the operational
slack to absorb the acquired targets.
5 Empirical analysis
There is evidence that PE investors have specic skills and large transaction experience
which enable them to select target rms with certain characteristics allowing the realization
of the investors' return goals. Additionally, the investors may try to increase the value of
the portfolio rms during the holding period aiming to realize an exit to a higher price than
the initial purchase price of the rm. To evaluate if there could be a value creation through
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PE investors or if potential improvements after B&B simply result from the selection of
better rms prior to the investment, we evaluate the transactions in two steps. The rst
step comprises the analysis of the selection eect before the transaction. In the second
step, we evaluate the sources of value creation based on the development of the rms after
the transaction.
5.1 Selection eect
In order to analyse the selection ability of PE investors, we rst identify those character-
istics which are related to a rm involved in a PE or B&B transaction by estimating logit
models separately for each transaction type and for platforms and add-ons in B&B. Sec-
ond, we compare the impact of these rm characteristics on the transactions by applying a
seemingly unrelated estimation approach. The empirical model is based on models which
have been estimated for M&A and PE transactions (see, e.g., Andrade and Staord 2004,
Opler and Titman 1993).
Pjt = 0 + 1ROAjt 1 + 2UTILjt 1 + 3GROWTHjt 1
+ 4DEBTjt 1 + 5SIZEjt 1 + 6HHIjt 1 + 7DEALSjt 1
+8
 !
Dc +9
 !
Di +10
 !
Dt + ujt 1
(1)
The dependent variables in the three logit regressions are dummy variables for the dierent
types of events and the dierent functions the rms can have. First, we look at the
probability of being a target of a PE transaction in general and then we focus on B&B
transaction. The probability of being a target in a B&B transaction is divided into being
a platform and being an add-on target.
All the explanatory variables for the companies involved in a transaction correspond to
the year before the transaction. The characteristics of the control group equal the mean
values of the variables during the analyzed time period of 2000 to 2008. For variable
description refer to Section 4.3 and the Appendix.
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlation coecients between various explanatory variables
used in the Logit regression analyses and their statistical signicance at the 5% level. The
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highest correlation of nearly minus 32% is measured between the protability measure and
the debt ratio. The higher the protability of the rm the lower its indebtedness. Fur-
thermore, the signicant negative relationship between HHI and number of deals indicates
that more transactions take place in less concentrated industries.
The coecients of the Logit regressions are presented in Table 4. Table 4 is divided
into six panels (A through F) which correspond to the transaction types private equity,
B&B platforms and B&B add-ons. Panels A to C show the results of the logit models
without and Panels D to F with the protability variable in order to control for potential
multicollinearity problems arising from the relatively high negative correlation between
ROA and DEBT. The Chow test columns show the results from tests on the coecients'
equality based on seemingly unrelated regressions for the PE targets compared to the B&B
sample. Table 5 presents the marginal eects of the explanatory variable.
In line with the growth-resource mismatch hypothesis of Barnes (2000) following which
low-growth and resource-rich rms are natural acquisition targets, we nd that a good
protability combined with a poor growth increases a rm's likelihood of being an add-on
in B&B. For the two other samples, the relationship between a rm's protability and
the probability of being involved in a transaction is also positive and statistically and
economically signicant. These results provide conrmation of Hypothesis 1a and suggest
that PE investors select more protable rms to invest in. However, we do not nd any
signicant dierence between the impact of protability for platforms and add-ons.
While turnover GROWTH has no signicant inuence on the selection of a target for a
usual PE transaction, higher GROWTH increases the probability of being selected as a
platform in B&B. This nding is in line with the results of Andrade and Staord (2004)
who show that growing acquirers can use mergers for expanding reasons. Furthermore, we
nd a signicant dierence between the positive coecient of GROWTH in the platform
equation and the negative coecient in the add-on equation. The opposite signs for
platforms and add-ons suggest that within B&B, growing rms seek to take over rms
which are growing more slowly and whose assets they can utilize more successfully. The
Chow tests show that the coecients of GROWTH in the PE and platform equations dier
signicantly which is an indication for the divergent selection criteria which are applied
by the PE investors for usual PE targets and for platforms.
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The signicant positive impact of capacity utilization, measured as the ratio of turnover
to total assets, on the transaction probability is not consistent with the ndings of Jensen
(1993) and Andrade and Staord (2004) for the 1970s and 1980s that mergers were moti-
vated by excess capacity. The positive relationship is consistent with the evidence of An-
drade and Staord (2004) for the 1990s that mergers can be motivated by expansion goals.
It seems that in the case of PE targets the investors prefer rms with a higher turnover
per rm's assets. When executing a B&B the investors may reallocate assets among the
platform and add-ons in order to increase the eciency of the groups. Therefore, it is
surprising that there is no signicant dierence between the coecients of capacity uti-
lization for both the platforms and add-ons. Capacity utilization has a similar eect on
the probability of being a platform or an add-on in a B&B.
The results reveal that rm SIZE is signicantly positively related to the probability of
being involved in a PE or B&B transaction. The Chow tests show that larger SIZE is most
important for platforms and less important for add-ons in B&B. This results correspond
to the ndings for acquirers in M&A which indicate that large rms have more resources
for executing acquisitions and have a greater potential for realizing synergies after the
transactions. The positive signs of SIZE for the add-ons are not consistent with the
ndings of Palepu (1985). Nevertheless, they are in line with the growth-maximization
theory of Mueller (1972). This implies that PE investors seek to achieve economies of
scale or market power through larger acquisitions.
The growth-resource imbalance hypothesis of Palepu (1986) indicates that, additionally to
the GROWTH of a rm, its liquidity is an important variable determining an acquisition.
Following Palepu, we proxy the nancial resource availability by DEBT. The marginal
eects in Table 5 show that DEBT is signicantly negatively related to the likelihood
of being a target in a PE transaction. This result is consistent with our expectations
that investors would select rms with sucient free debt capacity in order to absorb the
additional leverage from nancing the transaction. However, the impact of DEBT on the
probability of executing a B&B transaction is insignicant. Furthermore, we do not nd
any signicant dierences between the inuence of DEBT in the PE and B&B models.
As expected, decreasing industry concentration, measured as the HHI, increases the like-
lihood of being acquired as a platform for B&B by a PE investor. More fragmented
18
industries have a higher number of potential add-ons and provide industry consolidation
opportunities. The Chow tests indicate that the impact of HHI on B&B and PE transac-
tions diers signicantly.
In line with the preference of many PE investors to specialize in selected industries, we
nd that a higher number of executed deals in the rm's industry and country in the year
prior to the respective transaction increases the probability for this rm to be involved
in a transaction. This eect is highly statistically and economically signicant, indicating
that the investors use their experience and industry know-how from previous deals.
5.2 Value creation eect
To assess the value creation eect, we evaluate the impact of participation in a transaction
on the development of rms' nancial characteristics. We rst examine the changes of the
rms' nancial ratios during the three years after the PE and B&B transaction compared
to the year prior to the respective transaction. Second, we apply multivariate panel
regressions with rms xed eects to assess the impact of participation in a B&B on the
development of selected nancial characteristics and to identify the potential for value
creation.
5.2.1 Univariate analyses
The analysis of post-transaction changes of rm characteristics focuses on the percentage
changes in total assets, turnover and EBITDA as well as the ratios EBITDA to total
assets, debt to total assets, and turnover to total assets in the rst three years after the
deal completion (T= +1, +2 and +3) relative to the last year prior to the transaction
(t= -1). For comparison reasons we also calculate the last annual change prior to the
transaction (from t= -2 to t= -1).7 We control for industry-wide eects by analysing also
the industry-adjusted percentage change in the variables. The industry-adjusted change
is the median value of the industry-adjusted changes for all rms involved in PE or B&B
transactions. The rm specic industry-adjusted change is calculated as the percentage
change in the analyzed variables for the rm minus the median percentage change for
all rms in the same industry and country. Firms belong to the same industry if they
7This approach is similar to that used by Kaplan (1989).
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have the same two-digit NACE code as a primary industry code. In contrast to Kaplan
(1989), who uses four-digit SIC codes, we aggregate the industries to two-digits to ensure
a sucient number of matches even for smaller countries and industries.8
Similar to Kaplan (1989) we do not present results for the year of the transaction, year
0, due to interpretation problems. First, year 0 includes both pre- and post-transaction
operations. Second, the nancial information could be biased because of transaction-
relevant fees or specic accounting features in the year of consolidation.
Since further M&A or divestiture activities, which occur after the relevant transaction,
also aect the nancial characteristics of the rms, we consider the post-transaction ob-
servations for such rms only until the year at which the exit or the further transaction is
executed.
Table 6 reports the development of selected nancial characteristics from two years prior
to the transaction to three years after the transaction. The total assets for B&B rms
(platforms and add-ons) increase signicantly in all three years after the transaction com-
pared to the level in the last year prior to the transaction. Even, when controlling for
industry eects, the growth in total assets remains signicant for platforms in the years
+1 and +2 and for add-ons only in the year +1. In contrast, for PE targets the total
assets signicantly increase during all analyzed years even after industry adjustments.
In line with the results of the logit regression, the add-ons achieve lower (industry adjusted)
turnover growth and higher (industry adjusted) protability growth, measured in absolute
values (EBITDA) and as ratio EBITDA to total assets, in the year prior to the transaction
compared to the platforms. However, after the transaction the platforms realize larger
industry-adjusted turnover and protability growth.
The most interesting result pertains to the development of capacity utilization, measured
as the ratio of turnover to total assets, as it ties in directly to the allocation function of PE
investors discussed above. Combining platforms with lower utilization and add-ons with
higher utilization, the PE investors allocate resources and capacity more eciently. We
nd initial evidence supporting Hypothesis 3 as in the years two and three after the B&B,
the industry-adjusted utilization of the platforms increases signicantly and the utilization
8While Kaplan (1989) uses data on US rms we analyze the EU-15 countries which contain smaller
countries such as Greece or Austria.
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of the add-ons decreases signicantly in the rst year after the transaction. The industry-
adjusted development of utilization for common PE targets is positive as well but not as
strong.
While we nd a highly signicant industry-adjusted increase in the debt ratio for platforms
in the years one to three after the transaction, the development of the debt ratio for add-
ons is insignicant with the exception of the year +1 where it is moderate and slightly
signicant. The debt ratio for PE targets also increases signicantly but the growth is
lower than for the platforms. This univariate analysis shows that B&B trigger the high
indebtedness especially of platforms.
5.2.2 Multivariate regressions
Next, we employ a multivariate panel regression to investigate the impact of transactions
on rms' nancial gures and to identify the sources of value creation. The rm panel
includes nancial characteristics of rms involved in PE and B&B transactions, and their
matchings in all available years. For each of the variables of interest - ratios of total
debt to total assets, EBITDA to total assets and turnover to total assets and turnover
growth (Yj; t) - we estimate four model specications. The rst one includes a dummy
variable for the whole post-transaction period \POST" and an interaction term for the
rms involved in a transaction in the post-transaction period \POST*TRANS". The sec-
ond specication comprises dummies for the rst three post-transaction years separately
\POST1", \POST2", and \POST3" and an interaction term with each of them for the
treated rms. Additionally, the rst and second specication are re-estimated by including
a lagged dependent variable.
Yjt = 0 + 1POST + 2POST  TRANS + 3TRANS + 4Yjt 1 +5 !Dt +6 !Df + ujt 1
(2)
Yjt = 0 + 1POST1 + 2POST2 + 3POST3
+ 4POST1  TRANS1 + 5POST2  TRANS2 + 6POST3  TRANS3
+ 7TRANS1 + 8TRANS2 + 9TRANS3
+ 10Yjt 1 +11
 !
Dt +12
 !
Df + ujt 1
(3)
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We employ rm xed eects to control for time-invariant, unobservable rm characteristics
and use year dummy variables to account for time-varying conditions. As errors are
unlikely to be independent, we cluster them by company.
Finally, we split the sample into four groups. Firms with an industry-adjusted growth
or decrease of capacity utilization and rms with industry-adjusted growth or decrease in
debt ratio.
The results of the panel regressions which are presented in Table 7 conrm the ndings
of the pre- and post-transaction analysis. The positive coecients of the interaction
terms \TRANS*POST\ indicate that the leverage level for rms involved in a transaction
increases after the transaction. This eect seems to be stronger for platforms than for
PE targets and it is insignicant for add-ons. As expected, platform companies seem to
receive the leveraged nancing of both the own acquisition and the nancing of the add-
ons. The negative coecient of \POST\ for PE targets and their control rms suggest a
debt decline after the year observed as a transaction year.
In support of Hypothesis 3b, we nd dierent signs of the coecients on the interaction
terms for the ratio turnover to total assets which is the proxy for capacity utilization for
platforms and add-ons. While for add-ons, the participation in a B&B induces a signicant
negative eect on the rm's capacity utilization, the eect for platforms is positive, but
insignicant. Especially in the rst year after the B&B, the high initial utilization of
add-ons decreases signicantly. It seems that add-ons receive additional capacity which
reduces their realized turnover per asset. These results indicate that PE funds use B&B to
reallocate resources between the participating rms in order to realize eciency gains. We
nd a limited support of Hypothesis 2b as B&B increase the turnover growth signicantly
only of the platforms in the rst year after the transaction. The results of the panel
regressions show a strong persistence in the development of all dependent variables except
of turnover growth. We nd a signicantly positive relationship between the variables
ROE, the ratios debt to total assets and turnover to total assets and their lagged values
and a signicantly negative impact of the lagged turnover growth.
According to Gugler et al. (2003) transactions which increase the eciency of the involved
rms should increase both their prots and their turnover. As we did not nd a conrma-
tion of Hypothesis 1c for the whole samples of PE targets, platforms and add-ons, we split
the samples into subsamples of rms with growing or decreasing industry adjusted ratio of
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turnover to total assets and subsamples of growing or decreasing debt ratios, respectively.
The results of the panel regressions after the sample splits show that for platforms and
add-ons which increase their capacity utilization the protability improves after the trans-
action (see Table 8). Thus, B&B lead to eciency increase. In contrast, for platforms
with decreasing utilization the transaction leads to a negative eect on protability. The
coecient for add-ons is the same but insignicant.
Furthermore, B&B and PE transactions have a positive impact on protability for rms
with decreasing indebtedness. For PE targets and add-ons the industry adjusted debt
ratios of which increase, the protability worsens after the transaction. These results
contradict the positive eect of debt described by Jensen (1989) which could be due to
the relatively short time period analyzed after the transaction.
6 Conclusion
This paper describes a key strategy of private equity rms, the buy-and-build strategy,
and sheds light on the sources for value creation through buy-and-builds. The B&B is a
PE-backed M&A transaction: The PE investor acquires a platform rm and amend it by
further acquisition of add-on rms. The aim is to create a new entity which is superior
in terms of performance and in terms returns upon exit which the PE investment envis-
aged. The evaluation of the selection eect in buy-and-builds and the development of rm
characteristics after buy-and-builds enables the identication of value-adding potential.
Based on a sample of 844 rms involved in buy-and-builds between 2000 and 2008 in the
EU-15, we show that the selection of well performing rms prior to the transaction plays
a key role for the performance improvement of the portfolio rms after the transaction.
However, we nd additional value enhancing potentials which private equity investors may
explore through buy-and-builds.
The results on the development of capacity utilization after the buy-and-build in addition
to the pre-transaction analysis provide evidence that private equity funds might use buy-
and-builds to combine platforms with lower capacity utilization and lower returns, and
add-ons with higher utilization and higher returns in order to allocate resources and ca-
pacity more eciently. The low pre-transaction capacity utilization of platforms increases
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after buy-and-builds, and the high pre-transaction utilization of add-ons decreases after the
transaction. However, only for the subsamples of platforms and add-ons with increasing
industry adjusted utilization, the transaction has a positive impact on rms' protability,
suggesting that not the removal of excess capacity drives the positive performance but the
increase of realized turnover per asset unit.
This is the rst study to provide empirical evidence on the role of private equity funds
in facilitating mergers & acquisitions for portfolio rms and in creating value by applying
buy-and-build strategies. The performance improvements indusced by PE investors may
be explained by their engagement in shifting resources to more ecient uses and to better
managers but also by helping their portfolio companies to develop networks, to overcome
asymmetric information problems and to improve the exit chances. Thus, buy-and-builds
represent a key dimension of the value creation ability of private equity funds.
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Appendix
Variable description and sources
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
SIZE Firm size measured as rm's total assets. We use the log of
the variable. Source: Amadeus
HHI Industry concentration proxied by the Herndahl-
Hirschman-Index (HHI) for each two-digit US-SIC code
industry. HHI is dened as the sum of the squares of the
market shares of each company in an industry, country, and
year. Source: Amadeus
DEALS Number of private equity or B&B transaction in a two-digit
NACE Rev.2 industry code and country in the time period
2000-2008. Source: Zephyr
GROWTH Firm growth measured as the turnover growth per year.
Source: Amadeus
DEBT The ratio of total debt to total assets for each rm. De-
nitions and approach follow Baeyens and Manigart (2006).
Source: Amadeus
ROA Return on assets for each rm, calculated as the ratio of the
earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortiza-
tions (EBITDA) to the book value of total assets. Source:
Amadeus
UTIL Capacity utilization measured by the ratio of turnover to
total book assets. Source: Amadeus
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Table 1 
Number of companies involved in buy-and-build strategies as platforms and add-ons by year, country 
and industry 
   
Panel A: Breakdown by year 
 Buy-and-Build (total) Platform Add-on 
2000 11 3 8 
2001 2 1 1 
2002 17 8 9 
2003 27 13 14 
2004 36 17 19 
2005 98 43 55 
2006 162 52 110 
2007 225 71 154 
2008 266 89 177 
Total 844 297 547 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Breakdown by country 
 Buy-and-Build (total) Platform Add-on 
United Kingdom 246 84 162 
France 192 69 123 
Spain 76 31 45 
Germany 65 25 40 
Sweden 57 24 33 
Italy 49 14 35 
Netherlands 39 12 27 
Belgium 38 13 25 
Finland 36 10 26 
Denmark 21 5 16 
Portugal 9 4 5 
Ireland 8 2 6 
Austria  4 3 1 
Greece 3 1 2 
Luxembourg 1  1 
Total 844 297 547 
Table 2 
Summary statistics of firms involved in a buy-and-build strategy versus firms not involved in a buy-and-build strategy 
 
 Panel A Firms involved  in a buy-and-build strategy 
Firms not involved  
in a buy-and-build 
strategy 
Control sample 
t-test Wilcoxon 
test t-test Wilcoxon test 
  A mean 
 
median 
 
N 
B 
mean 
 
median 
 
N 
C 
mean 
 
median 
 
N 
A-B A-C 
  
Total assets (th. Euro) 116,212 9,862 773 1,479 223 7033679 124,836 9,493 2,526 *** ***   
Debt / total assets 0.62 0.58 682 0.66 0.66 6319409 0.62 0.61 1,768 *** ***   
Turnover / total assets 1.59 1.36 591 1.76 1.38 4695078 1.45 1.18 1,439 ***  ** *** 
Turnover growth 0.30 0.07 530 0.2 0.04 3912827 0.40 0.06 1,201     
EBITDA / total assets  0.15 0.13 617 0.03 0.02 5420271 0.09 0.08 1,577 *** *** *** *** 
 
Panel B Private equity  Buy-and-build Platforms 
Buy-and-build 
Add-ons 
t-test Wilcoxon 
test 
t-test Wilcoxon 
test 
t-test Wilcoxon 
Test 
 A   B C A-B A-C B-C  
 mean median N mean median N mean median N       
Total assets (th. Euro) 116,669 17,792 1394 298,053 68,489 264 22,115 4,341 504 *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Debt / total assets 0.66 0.58 1255 0.58 0.58 237 0.64 0.58 443 *    *  
Turnover / total assets 1.69 1.44 1172 1.30 1.07 216 1.77 1.54 371 *** ***  *** *** *** 
Turnover growth 0.61 0.08 1008 0.33 0.07 188 0.29 0.07 342       
EBITDA / total assets  0.16 0.14 1217 0.12 0.10 227 0.17 0.15 388 *** ***   *** *** 
 
This table reports summary statistics of firms involved in a buy-and-build strategy during the time period 2000 to 2008 versus firms not involved in a buy-and-build 
strategy (Panel A) as well as  summary statistics of firms involved in a private equity transaction versus firms involved in a buy-and-build strategy as a platform or 
an add-on (Panel B). Panel A and Panel B present means and medians of the independent variables total assets and the ratios of debt to total assets, turnover to 
total assets, turnover growth and EBITDA to total assets. The data for the firms involved in a buy-and-build or private equity transaction corresponds to the year 
before the transaction. The data for the control group corresponds to the median values for the time period 1999 to 2008. Variable definitions are provided in the 
Appendix. The number of observations varies across items due to data availability. I test for the equality of means (t-test allowing for unequal variances) and the 
equality of distributions (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test) between each two groups of firms. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
Table 3 
Bivariate correlations for the independent variables 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Total assets  1       
2. Debt / total assets -0.1519*    1      
3. Turnover / total assets -0.2681*   0.1655*   1     
4. Turnover growth  -0.0472*   0.0676*   -0.0248*   1    
5. EBITDA / total assets -0.0376*   -0.3157*   0.1396*   -0.0387*   1   
6. HHI 0.0119*   -0.0225* 0.0165* -0.0041* 0.0352*   1    
7. Number deals -0.0104*   0.0062* 0.1363* -0.0068* 0.0276*   -0.1792* 1   
 
This table shows the correlations of the independent variables used in the logit regression analysis. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. 
* Denotes significance of the correlation coefficients at the 5% level. 
Table 4 
Firm and industry characteristics influencing the probability of being involved in a private equity or buy-and-build transaction 
 
 Private equity Platforms Add-ons Chow-Tests 
Private 
equity Platforms Add-ons Chow-Tests 
 A B C A-B A-C B-C D E F D-E D-F E-F 
Total assets (log) 0.722*** 0.831*** 0.637*** *** *** *** 0.752*** 0.854*** 0.672*** *** *** *** 
 (0.009) (0.020) (0.015) (26.56) (25.31) (64.20) (0.010) (0.021) (0.017) (19.93) (17.39)  (46.20) 
Debt / total assets -0.339** -0.040 -0.121    -0.026 0.158 0.066     
 (0.135) (0.319) (0.230) (0.75) (0.67) (0.04) (0.140) (0.316) (0.245) (0.29) (0.11)  (0.05) 
Turnover / total assets 0.228*** 0.189*** 0.225***    0.144*** 0.114* 0.178***     
 (0.020) (0.051) (0.028) (0.50) (0.01) (0.38) (0.023) (0.062) (0.032) (0.21) (0.77)  (0.85) 
Turnover growth 0.014 0.250*** -0.056 **  ** -0.035 0.197 -0.050 *    
 (0.056) (0.093) (0.114) (4.73) (0.30) (4.31) (0.068) (0.122) (0.130) (2.78) (0.01)  (1.93) 
EBITDA / total assets          3.382*** 3.178*** 2.799***     
          (0.244) (0.567) (0.467) (0.11) (1.23)  (0.27) 
HHI 0.976** -1.855* 0.044 **   0.579 -2.096* 0.031 **    
 (0.414) (1.083) (0.857) (6.06) (0.98) (1.91) (0.451) (1.119) (0.875) (5.01) (0.32)  (2.26) 
Number deals (log) 0.936*** 1.964*** 1.564***    0.941*** 1.933*** 1.532***     
 (0.051) (0.165) (0.103)    (0.052) (0.159) (0.099)     
Industry, country 
dummies Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes    
Pseudo R2 22.67% 26.19% 25.33%    26.19% 25.33% 22.67%    
No. observations 1,776,941 1,995,577 1,615,798    1,995,577 1,615,798 1,776,941    
 
Panels A to F of this table present the coefficients of logit models on the likelihood of being involved in a private equity transaction (A, D) and in a buy-and-build transaction as a 
platform (B, E) or an add-on (C, F). Firms involved in buy-and-build strategies are excluded from the samples for the models A and B. The dependent variable in each model equals 
one if a company is involved in a transaction and zero otherwise. All independent variables for the companies involved in a transaction correspond to the year prior to the transaction. 
The characteristics of the control group equal the median values of the variables during the analyzed time period 1999 to 2008. “Number deals” corresponds to the number 
transactions (private equity or buy-and-build in an industry/country during the analysed time period). Columns A-C to D-F display the Chow tests on the coefficients’ equality based on 
seemingly unrelated regressions for the different subsamples. The independent variables are described in the Appendix and their descriptive statistics are given in Table 4. Robust 
standard errors for the logit models and Chi-squared values for the Chow tests are shown in parentheses. ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Table 5 
Marginal effects after logit for the likelihood of being involved in a buy-and-build, mergers & acquisitions transaction or private equity transaction 
 
 Private equity Buy-and-build Platforms 
Buy-and-build 
Add-ons 
 A B C D E F 
Total assets (log) 0.0427*** 0.0398*** 0.00423*** 0.00396*** 0.0163*** 0.0157*** 
Debt / total assets -0.02*** -0.00137 -0.000204 0.000734 -0.00311 0.00154 
Turnover / total assets 0.0135*** 0.00762*** 0.000964*** 0.00053 0.00578*** 0.00417*** 
Turnover growth 0.000837 -0.00187 0.00127*** 0.000914* -0.00144 -0.00118 
EBITDA / total assets  0.1787***  0.0148***  0.0654*** 
HHI 0.0577** 0.0306 -0.00944 -0.00973* 0.00112 0.00724 
Number deals (log) 0.0553*** 0.0497*** 0.00999*** 0.00898*** 0.0401*** 0.0358*** 
Chi2 3,991 4,075 1,231 1,232 1,000 1,041 
No. observations 3,474,931 3,369,454 3,470,812 3,365,759 3,473,383 3,365,891 
 
This table presents the marginal effects on the likelihood of being involved in a private equity transaction or in a buy-and-build strategy as a platform of an add-
on. All marginal effects are multiplied by 1000. The dependent variable equals one if a company is involved in a transaction; and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables are described in the Appendix. The marginal effects are evaluated at the sample means of the independent variables. The robust standard 
errors for the marginal effects have a very low value of nearly 0, thus they are not presented. ***, **,* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Table 6 
Changes in firm characteristics from the pre-transaction period to the post-transaction period 
 
 
Private equity 
Buy-and-build 
Platforms 
Buy-and-build 
Add-ons 
 
-2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2  -1 to +3 -2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2  -1 to +3 -2 to -1 -1 to +1 -1 to +2  -1 to +3 
Total Assets (th. Euro) 17792    68408    4275    
Percentage change 6.84%*** 10.78%*** 15.93%*** 13.73%*** 7.81%*** 18.53%*** 12.39%*** 12.74%** 5.29%*** 8.38%*** 10.87%*** 9.37%* 
Industry adjusted 3.30%*** 4.23%*** 5.32%*** 1.54%*** 5.00%*** 10.87%*** 3.81%* -4.40% 2.95%*** 4.66%** 2.38% -3.14% 
Number observations 1212 845 587 404 227 151 98 53 474 230 138 65 
Turnover (th. Euro) 29577     64112    8825    
Percentage change 7.69%*** 12.95%*** 18.29%*** 20.77%*** 7.21%*** 18.60%*** 32.28%*** 33.63%*** 6.64%*** 5.79% 13.49%*** 20.76%*** 
Industry adjusted 3.33%*** 4.46%*** 8.11%*** 10.30%*** 2.15%** 12.38%*** 20.83%*** 25.60%*** 0.95%** 0.24% 7.74%* 12.68%* 
Number observations 1007 684 493 344 190 122 76 43 341 156 93 41 
EBITDA (th. Euro) 2428    5941    908    
Percentage change 12.01%*** 15.41%*** 19.77%*** 9.78%** 9.91%*** 15.88%* 25.93%*** 19.81% 10.55%*** 3.45% 4.25% 16.36%* 
Industry adjusted 7.96%*** 6.22%*** 10.53%*** 5.04%** 2.70%* 6.93% 13.73%* 18.85% 5.09%** 0.71% 3.85% 11.55% 
Number observations 1046 720 502 344 193 122 79 44 359 169 99 44 
EBITDA/TA 0.14    0.10    0.15    
Percentage change 3.79%*** -5.14% -3.23% -15.58% 0.09% -8.60% -0.29% 7.91% 4.13%* -9.86% -12.41% -6.88% 
Industry adjusted 4.83%*** 0.34% 3.11%** -3.53% 1.51% -7.21% 7.46% 19.10%* 4.76%** -6.81% -5.67% 9.29% 
Number observations 1045 720 502 344 193 122 79 44 359 169 98 44 
Debt/TA 0.58    0.58    0.58    
Percentage change -0.91% 3.24%*** 3.97%*** 6.49%*** 2.88%** 5.34%*** 12.53%** 16.33%*** -0.63% 1.14% -1.32% -0.75% 
Industry adjusted -0.36% 5.14%*** 7.49%*** 11.44%*** 3.26%*** 8.73%*** 14.15%*** 21.95%*** -0.06% 2.99%* 2.93% 2.43% 
Number observations 1057 712 490 332 203 129 83 42 392 159 95 46 
Turnover/TA 1.44    1.07    1.54    
Percentage change 1.53%** 1.41%* 1.84%* 1.98% 0.68% 1.07% 7.11% 3.67% 0.51%* -8.86%*** -2.19% 2.35% 
Industry adjusted 1.69%*** 2.00%** 3.50%*** 4.85%** 1.01% 1.79% 6.68%* 7.65%** 0.44%* -7.54%*** -0.01% 7.48% 
Number observations 1006 684 493 344 190 122 76 43 341 155 92 41 
This table reports median percentage changes and industry-adjusted changes in total assets, the ratios of debt to total assets, returns to equity, and turnover to 
total assets for the three years (year +1, +2, +3) after a private equity or buy-and-build transaction relative to the values in the year ending prior to completion of 
the deal (year -1). Industry-adjusted change for a given period equals the difference between the change for the company involved in a transaction and the 
median change for a sample of companies in the same industry and country during the same period. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. The 
number of observations varies across items due to data availability. Significance levels are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 7 
Panel regressions for firms involved in private equity and buy-and-build transactions  
 
 
Debt / Total assets  
Private equity B&B Platforms B&B Add-ons 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
Post -0.012***  -0.008**  0.003  0.001  0.001  -0.002  
Trans x Post 0.032***  0.025***  0.069***  0.045***  0.024  0.030  
Post1  -0.011***  -0.009***  0.020**  0.016**  -0.004  -0.005 
Post2  -0.011**  -0.007*  0.015  0.005  0.014  0.009 
Post3  -0.008  -0.002  0.021  0.014  0.003  0.001 
Trans x Post 1  0.026***  0.023***  0.035**  0.022  0.040*  0.034* 
Trans x Post 2  0.032***  0.024***  0.044*  0.036*  0.014  0.020 
Trans x Post 3  0.029***  0.017*  0.057*  0.034  -0.014  -0.006 
Y_t-1   0.401*** 0.402***   0.403*** 0.403***   0.396*** 0.396*** 
Year, Firm FE Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant Yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.005 0.005 0.167 0.167 0.010 0.008 0.177 0.176 0.005 0.006 0.159 0.159 
No. observ. 36493 36493 29870 29870 7105 7105 5833 5833 12,559 12,559 10,171 10,171 
 
Turnover / Total assets  
Private equity B&B Platforms B&B Add-ons 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
Post 0.045***  0.041***   0.071**  0.064***   0.053  0.047*   
Trans x Post -0.007  -0.004   0.033  0.035   -0.155**  -0.172***   
Post1  0.033**  0.029**  0.045  0.041  0.051  0.038 
Post2  0.016  0.013  0.049  0.044  0.081*  0.082** 
Post3  0.032*  0.032**  0.058  0.057*  0.080  0.065 
Trans x Post 1  -0.002  -0.006  0.000  0.022  -0.228***  -0.246*** 
Trans x Post 2  0.014  0.004  0.039  0.030  -0.105  -0.125 
Trans x Post 3  -0.004  -0.004  0.023  0.006  0.045  0.042 
Y_t-1   0.342*** 0.342***   0.377*** 0.378***   0.266*** 0.266*** 
Year, Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.004 0.004 0.129 0.129 0.006 0.005 0.166 0.164 0.008 0.010 0.083 0.085 
No. observ. 33543 33543 27853 27853 6467 6467 5364 5364 10,948 10,948 9,033 9,033 
  
EBITDA / Total assets  
Private equity B&B Platforms B&B Add-ons 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
Post -0.005**  -0.003   -0.000  0.003   -0.011*  -0.003   
Trans x Post -0.004  -0.005   -0.004  0.002   0.007  -0.003   
Post1  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.008*  -0.009  -0.008 
Post2  -0.001  0.001  0.002  0.004  -0.025**  -0.014 
Post3  -0.004  -0.003  0.004  0.004  -0.022*  -0.014 
Trans x Post 1  -0.002  -0.004  -0.014  -0.007  0.008  0.001 
Trans x Post 2  -0.011  -0.008  0.006  0.009  0.033*  0.017 
Trans x Post 3  -0.004  0.000  -0.003  0.003  0.015  0.003 
Y_t-1   0.264*** 0.265***   0.306*** 0.306***   0.180*** 0.180*** 
Year, Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.005 0.005 0.079 0.079 0.005 0.005 0.099 0.099 0.005 0.006 0.037 0.038 
No. observ. 35133 35133 29228 29228 6810 6810 5668 5668 11,715 11,715 9,660 9,660 
 
Turnover growth  
Private equity B&B Platforms B&B Add-ons 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 C1 C2 C3 C4 D1 D2 D3 D4 
Post -0.003  -0.004  -0.027  0.025  0.028  0.008  
Trans x Post 0.028  0.033**  0.108  0.063  0.008  0.02  
Post1  -0.021*  -0.011  -0.015  0.034  0.024  0.016 
Post2  -0.014  -0.011  0.001  0.009  0.001  -0.019 
Post3  -0.002  -0.002  -0.063  -0.035  0.035  0.017 
Trans x Post 1  0.062***  0.066***  0.218***  0.129**  0.002  0.019 
Trans x Post 2  0.009  0.011  -0.058  -0.042  0.067  0.064 
Trans x Post 3  -0.016  -0.028  0.058  0.03  -0.029  -0.003 
Y_t-1   -0.115*** -0.115***   -0.05*** -0.05***   -0.126*** -0.125*** 
Year, Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.021 0.021 0.03 0.031 0.015 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.021 0.021 0.031 0.032 
No. observ. 29514 29514 24197 24197 5654 5654 4626 4626 9490 9490 7746 7746 
 
 
This table reports the results of panel regressions with the dependent variables ratio of EBITDA to total assets (Panel A, return on equity, ROE), ratio of total debt to total assets 
(Panel B), the ratio of turnover to total assets (Panel C) and the turnover growth (Panel D) – for the samples of PE targets, firms involved in B&B as a whole, and firms involved in 
B&B as platforms or add-ons. “Post” is a dummy variable with a value of one in all years after the transaction for treated and control companies and zero in the years prior to the 
transactions. “Trans x Post” is an interaction term which equals one for treated companies in all years after the respective transaction. Post1, Post2 or Post3 equal 1 only in the 
year 1, 2 or 3 after the transaction, respectively, and 0 in the remaining years. “Trans x Post1/Post2/Post3” are interaction terms with a value of 1 for treated companies in the 
respective year 1, 2 or 3 after the transaction. Y_t-1 denotes a lagged dependent variable. All regressions include a constant, year and firm fixed effects. The standard errors are 
clustered by company. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Table 8 
Panel regressions for firms involved in private equity and buy-and-build transactions splitted in subsamples of firms with an industry adjusted Turnover / Total 
Assets growth vs. Turnover / Total Assets decline after the transaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 EBITDA / Total assets  
  Private equity   B&B Platforms  B&B Add-ons  
 TO/TA growth 
TO/TA 
decrease 
Debt/TA 
growth 
Debt /TA 
decrease 
TO/TA 
growth 
TO/TA 
decrease 
Debt/TA 
growth 
Debt /TA 
decrease 
TO/TA 
growth 
TO/TA 
decrease 
Debt/TA 
growth 
Debt /TA 
decrease 
Trans x Post 0.012*** -0.007 -0.016*** 0.014*** 0.030*** -0.054*** 0.001 0.008 0.024* -0.006 -0.026** 0.035** 
Post -0.006* -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 0.026*** 0.003 0.008 -0.033*** -0.009 -0.007 -0.026** 
Year, Firm FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R2 0.004 0.01 0.011 0.005 0.026 0.023 0.014 0.023 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.025 
No. observ. 10174 9101 11658 7774 1762 1578 2349 995 1617 2750 2381 1896 
 
